This paper discusses the merits of the statutory approach to sovereign debt crises. It presents a model of sovereign debt roll-overs where, in the event of a liquidity crisis, a Sovereign Bankruptcy Court has powers to declare a standstill on debt payments. The model shows the ability of the Court to mitigate the coordination problem inherent to roll-overs in sovereign debt markets. Moreover, the scale of the coordination problem is reduced regardless of the quality of the information handled by the Court. The mere existence of the Court forces investors to focus on its course of action rather than on other investors beliefs. Nonetheless, such an entity might affect negatively countries' incentives to apply costly policies. Abstract This paper discusses the merits of the statutory approach to sovereign debt crises. It presents a model of sovereign debt roll-overs where, in the event of a liquidity crisis, a Sovereign Bankruptcy Court has powers to declare a sandstill on debt payments. The model shows the ability of the Court to mitigate the coordination problem inherent to roll-overs in sovereign debt markets. Moreover, the scale of the coordination problem is reduced regardless of the quality of the information handled by the Court. The mere existence of the Court forces investors to focus on its course of action rather than on other investors'beliefs. Nonetheless, such an entity might a¤ect negatively countries'incentives to apply costly policies.
Introduction
Financial globalization has led to important changes in …nancial structures. In the realm of the sovereign entities, this process was re ‡ected in a marked shift from bank …nancing to market …nancing through bond issuance, both domestically and abroad. 1 This has had clear advantages. Access to an increasing number of jurisdictions where to issue and an increased number of instruments broadened emerging markets'investor base. This, in turn, helped domestic …-nancial deepening and reduced funding costs (Andritzky, 2012) . The process, however, also brought risks. The trend toward market …nancing has made sovereigns more vulnerable to abrupt reversions in capital ‡ows (sudden-stops).
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On top of this, for sovereigns unable to service their debts, the increased complexity of debt structures poses a threat to …nding adequate ways to restructure them. Greece, which just conducted a debt buyback after the restructuring of its domestic law bonds in 2011 proved insu¢ cient to reverse the underlying debt dynamics, is a case in point. Argentina is another recent example. Through its interpretation of the pari-passu clause, a recent ruling by a US Court, where a private creditor is suing Argentina over the 2001 default, threatens to force Argentina to repay dissenting creditors in full. 2 Sovereign debt crises can be fundamental, if debt is so large that without debt relief the country can not stabilize it, or liquidity-driven, when a temporary mismatch between revenues and expenses limits the sovereign ability to repay. While this di¤erence can be crucial, the need to coordinate with a group of heterogeneous creditors is common to both types of events. Indeed, coordination problems can drive an illiquid Government into insolvency. Other manifestations of the coordination problem include investors fearing a restructuring and pulling out of the country (the so-called "rush for the exits"). 3 The recognition of this myriad of problems prompted an intense debate, still ongoing, on how to structure the International Financial Architecture to limit the incidence of future crises. Traditionally, the solution to sovereign distress has been a combination of o¢ cial assistance and/or debt restructuring with the Paris and London Clubs. On this debate, there are two well established camps. On the one side, there are those that advocate for market solutions such as the inclusion of collective action clauses into bond contracts or the development of guiding principles, like the IIF's Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Debt Restructuring. On the other are the supporters of statutory solutions, including the creation of sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms (SDRM) or an International bankruptcy regime. While after the Mexican-Asian crises market solutions appeared to have gained broader support, recent events in Europe highlight the need to complement market mechanisms. Market solutions were appealing because they allowed for ad-hoc solutions, potentially better suiting country speci…c aspects. The downside is that, as argued in Sachs (1995) , ‡exibility comes at the cost of increased uncertainty about the o¢ cial sector's path of action. 4 What is needed is a credible mechanism to prevent speculators from turning a liquidity crisis in a sovereign debt market into a solvency crisis.
In this context, the objective of the paper is to provide a fresh look at the statutory approach to crisis resolution from a theoretical perspective. The paper studies the scope for creating a Sovereign Bankruptcy Court (SBC), which would monitor countries and be empowered to declare payment standstills when crises 2 See Schumacher et al. (2012) for an excellent overview on litigation against sovereigns. 3 Also, depending on the legal structure of the debt, unanimity requirements might allow a minority of holders ("hold-outs") to stop a debt restructuring. Even if this is not the case, hold-outs may push for full repayment and take advantage of other investros willingness to renegotiate ("free-riding"). Moreover, the so-called vulture funds, might strangle the country by suing it for repayment in di¤erent jurisdictions ("strangulation by litigation"). 4 The absence of a clear route map can protract debt restructuring inde…nitely. Too often crises are solved only after a series of partial solutions. See Diaz-Cassou et al. (2008) . are due to temporary illiquidity. 5 I show that a Court designed in such way reduces the coordination problem faced by creditors. On the negative side, I show that the SBC, by supporting countries when in need, will likely reduce sovereigns' incentives to apply costly policies ex-ante. Similar to Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2012) , conditioning access to the SBC on a veri…able variable o¤sets the negative e¤ect on e¤ort of unconditional recourse to the Court.
From a technical point of view, this paper draws on Corsetti et al. (2006) , who uses a global game to analyze the e¤ect of IMF lending on debt roll-overs. 6 As investors need to focus on the Court's behavior, the extent to which other investors'beliefs matter is reduced, facilitating coordination. The creation of a SBC and the use of payment standstills to protect countries from litigation are not new to the theoretical literature. Haldane et al. (2002) present a rollover global game where standstills are modelled as an exit tax. As Haldane et al. (2002) and Corsetti et al. (2005) , I place the coordination problem at the core but, by explicitly modelling the Court, I can study it's strategic interaction with investors. Miller and Zhang (2000) argue that, without an orderly procedure, the IMF is forced to bail out distressed members, fostering investors' moral hazard. A payments' standstills would rescue the Fund from this 'time inconsistency' trap. show that the e¤ectiveness of standstills depend on the quality of o¢ cial sector's surveillance. I show conditions under which a better informed Court reduces the coordination problem. Haldane et al. (2004a Haldane et al. ( , 2004b show that payment moratoria are useful during liquidity crises and that a international bankruptcy court could also improve on the outcome of solvency crises. Their results grant much less e¤ectiveness to market approaches such CACs or the creation of creditor committees. show that if the Court increases the recovery rate, it need not generate a rush for the exits. In Martin and Peñalver (2003) standstills tilt the sovereign's term structure through reduced liquidity and default risk. Eaton (2003) shows that an SBC could elicit debtor's moral hazard. 7 Jeanne and Bolton (2007) argue that the coordination problem has the ex-ante e¤ect of fostering debt structures sub-optimally hard to restructure. This is the result of investors'competing to guarantee repayment in an event of stress. They show that a SBC would be an adequate tool to correct this ine¢ ciency. Recently, Jeanne (2009) studies the interaction between the maturity structure and the international …nancial architecture. In a model where short term debt is used as a commitment device, Jeanne …nds that well-intentioned policies might back…re if they facilitate countries'exit from a crisis He shows that an international court acting only under some ex-ante conditions would reduce the degree of market incompleteness and improve welfare. As in Ghosal and Miller (2003) and Jeanne (2009) , I …nd that 5 Voices to grant Greece a debt payments moratorium emerged as the need to provide debt relief shifted from privately held to o¢ cially held debt. 6 The following section summarizes the evolution of the statutory approach. Section II outlines a simple model of self-ful…lling debt crises. In Section III the international arbitrator is introduced into the game, and some basic features of both models are compared. Section IV evaluates the implications for authorities' e¤ort and discusses how the results change if the Court would be used to address insolvency. Section V concludes.
I. Statutory versus market approach
The succession of crises since the mid 90's (Mexico, Thailand) prompted an intense debate on how to improve our mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of debt crises. Various far-reaching proposals were discussed both in academic and o¢ cial circles. Part of the debate focused on the extent to which crises had been primarily a result of failures in international …nancial markets or were due to mistaken policies. Those stressing the importance of market failures advocated for the creation of a meaningful o¢ cial …nancial safety net articulated around a lender of last resort (Fisher, 1999) . In turn, those stressing policy failures prioritized the need to avoid distorting the incentives of sovereigns and their private lenders, placing moral hazard at the centre of the discussion (Simpson, 2006) . In parallel, the debate revolved around the intimately related perspective of the nature of the reforms required. Two approaches stood out: the contractual or market approach and the statutory approach.
The contractual or market-based approach argues in favour of solutions implying the minimum level of institutional intervention. It's proponents defend the creation of sets of principles, like the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Debt Restructuring, to guide the behavior of the di¤erent actors, and the inclusion of clauses in bond contracts, such as collective action clauses (CACs) (see Eichengreen et al., 2003) . 8 In contrast, those defending the statutory approach argue in favour of having an international institution in charge of intermediating the disputes between sovereign debtors and their creditors and enabling it to lead the steps whenever a country requires a payments standstill or a debt restructuring. As discussed below, the most relevant proposals to establish an international authority are based on the Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. The best known example is the SDRM proposal (Krueger, 2002) . Eventually, the debate resulted in a compromise geared towards market solutions, of which the Rey Report and the Prague Framework for crisis resolution are good examples. 9 According to the Prague framework, adopted in 2001, liquidity crises ought to be resolved by combining limited and predictable o¢ cial assistance, catalysis of private capital ‡ows, and private sector involvement (PSI). Simi-larly, the inclusion of CACs in sovereign bonds , as advocated by the G-10, has been a successful experience. 10 Still, other contractual innovations such as aggregation clauses may be needed.
According to Rogo¤ and Zettelmeyer (2003) , discussions regarding the need to adequate the international …nancial architecture (IFA) to problems stemming from sovereign debtors date back to before World War II. 11 The …rst o¢ cial discussion goes back to the Meeting of the Group of 77 developing countries at Arhusa in 1979. Remarkably, issues such as need of an arbiter, the coordination problem and the importance of new …nancing, were already mentioned. 12 The …rst reference to an international Chapter 11 for private creditors appeared in Oechsli (1981) . Although Oechsli referred to coordination problems among investors, his proposal aimed at reducing the uncertainty surrounding the resolution path, what, in his view, was the main cause for delays in resolving debt problems. The work of Sachs (1984) on coordination and free riding and that of Krugman (1989) on debt overhang (distinction between solvency and liquidity) were instrumental for subsequent proposals. Rogo¤ and Zettelmeyer (2003) highlight four early proposals within the statutory approach Barnett et al. (1984) , Cohen (1989) , Ra¤er (1990) and Kaeser (1990) . Kaeser (1990) is the …rst to argue that a bankruptcy procedure should be used to …ght overindebtedness but not temporary payments di¢ culties The Brady plan and the ensuing resumption in capital ‡ows stopped the discussion temporarily. 13 After the Mexican crisis in 1995 had to be resolved with an extraordinary loan by the US Authorities, the debate came back. Je¤rey Sachs (1995) gave a tremendous boost to it. He advocated for the development of elements that would allow the IFA to go towards the creation of a Sovereign Bankruptcy Court. In line with Oechsli (1981) , Sachs argued that the lack of a well de…ned legal framework led to ad-hoc restructurings with uncertain results. Such institution should be able to: (i) avoid a freeze in the public sector during the restructuring (use standstills to avoid legal prosecution), (ii) promote creditors' coordination and (iii) incentivize responsible debt management practices. Chun (1996) presented a similar proposal, although he saw this option as a solution to the coordination problem (illiquidity). 14 Eichengreen and Portes (1995, 1997) proposed a system where a trustee would help coordinate the bondholders committees, while considering the position of dissenting creditors. In their view the mechanism should focus on liquidity crises and avoid grab races which could further damage the economy.Their porposal included elements of the market approach such as the inclusion of CACs. Bank of Canada and Bank of England 1 0 Such provisions were included in debt exchanges by Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay (IMF, 2005). The Greek Government included them retroactively on its domestic debt instruments prior to last year's debt restructuring. 1 1 Rogo¤ and Zettelmeyer (2003) present an excellent discussion of the various proposals on how to resolve sovereign debt problems going back to the late seventies. 1 2 This proposal was, however, focused on o¢ cial creditors. 1 3 Within the existing statutory approach, the 80s saw the inception of the IMF's lending into arrears policy. Debevoise (1984) proposed to use Article VII (2) of the Fund's articles of agreement to protect (against legal prosecution) countries unilaterally declaring a standstill. 1 4 Also the IMF's legal department (1995) studied if the Fund could …ll such role.
presented a joint proposal for handling crises through a combination of o¢ cial …nancing and private sector involvement (PSI). PSI would be either voluntary through debt exchanges and roll-overs, or involuntary, using payments standstills to provide time to …nd a solution. 15 To override the required legal changes in a large number of jurisdictions, they proposed a non-statutory approach similar to the IMF's Lending into Arrears Policy (LiA). 16 Finally, the IMF presented the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (Krueger, 2002) . 17 It advocated for a system where a super-majority of creditors to a country could impose a debt restructuring on all creditors, while avoiding legal action by holdouts. The system granted the country immunity through a payments standstill while the debt restructuring was negotiated. 18 Despite it's lack of success, at the time the market approach seemed to have gained the debate, The SDRM was by far the most seriously debated proposal. 19 Given the depth of the crisis in the Eurozone, the framework for sovereign crises resolution is again under scrutiny. European authorities created two facilities to complement the support provided by the IMF, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF). While the latter is aimed at tackling liquidity problems and did not contemplate PSI, the ESM was set-up to deal also with situations in which debt relief by private creditors is required, much in line with the IMF's Lending into Arrears Policy.
The framework outlined here di¤ers from Sachs (1995) and Anne Krueger's SDRM in that it is designed to cope with temporary payment problems. In this regard it coincides with the proposal by Chun (1996) and Haldane and Saporta (2003) in that it aims at reducing ine¢ cient runs on sovereign debt markets. Another important di¤erence of the approach here is that it only relies on standstills and remains silent as regards other forms of private sector involvement, such as direct debt restructurings, which characterize proposals like the ESM or the SDRM, aimed at addressing solvency problems.
II. A benchmark model
To set a benchmark, I use a model with standard features in the spirit of Chui et al. (2002) . The model analyzes a small open-economy government's …nancing decisions. It stretches over three time periods de…ned below. A government with resources amounting to O; has access to an international liquid asset M and to a risky investment I. In order to carry on the investment, the government needs external …nancing whenever O < I. It can obtain it from a mass-one continuum 1 5 According to them, a payments standstill would facilitate coordination by aligning creditors'and debtors'incentives. 1 6 See Diaz-Cassou et al. (2008) and Erce (2013) for a critical review of this policy. 1 7 Schwarcz (2000) , Eichengreen (2000) or Krueger and Haldane (2001) for other proposals. 1 8 In a …rst version the power to declare a standstill was given to the IMF. This was so controversial that in a second version it was to be taken jointly by the Fund and a super majority of creditors. 1 9 Bolton and Skeel (2004) argue that if the SDRM would focus on guaranteeing the existence priority in repayment, it needed not a¤ect negatively the cost and availability of funds. of investors, willing to lend in a short term horizon at an interest rate i. The outside option for the investors is a safe asset with rate of return i w which, for simplicity, is set to zero. The risky investment yields in period 2, or = (1 + k) in period 1. The parameter k 2 (0; 1) re ‡ects a cost associated with the early liquidation of the investment. I assume that is normally distributed with mean b and variance 1 = : 20 In period 0, the government borrows an amount D 0 . It then uses O and D 0 to invest in the risky investment and the liquid asset, O + D 0 = M + I: These parameters are taken as given. As borrowing is short term and the investment matures in period 2, , in period 1 the Government needs to roll over this debt. Ahead of the roll-over, investors receive a private noisy signal about and use it to decide wether to roll-over or not. When deciding to roll-over Investors do not know if the Government will repay or not. In period 2, the government repays outstanding debt and consumes whatever left.
Liquidity and solvency
Think …rst of a scenario where all investors roll over. Given the amount due, . After that, in period 2, the country counts with resources (1 l)I to repay outstanding debt (1 f )D: Then, the minimum rate at which the country is still be solvent is,
Payo¤s and information
As in Rochet and Vives (2004) and Corsetti et al. (2006) , private investors' payo¤ structure depends on making the right choice. If the …nal outcome is a default, creditors ‡eeing receive w more units of utility than those rolling over. Instead, if the project succeeds, those who rolled over get utility r units above those who withdrew. 21 This assumption makes the perceived utility independent of the extent of default, implying that the analysis abstracts from distributional issues between the creditors and the country.
Creditors get a signal s i = + " i , where " i is normally distributed with zero mean and precision . Their updated beliefs are normally distributed,
The mean of this distribution will be denoted by 2 0 Rate of return and the fundamentals of the economy will be used as synonyms. 2 1 If investors have a utility function which is just the sum of consumption at any date and waiting gives bigger consumption, waiting is the right option. Another way to rationalize these pay-o¤s is by assuming that investors'choices are driven by reputational concerns
and stand for the standardized cumulative distribution and the associated density function respectively:I assume that is unknown, but its distribution, as that of investors'private signals, is common knowledge.
Equilibrium: runs and solvency
As it is standard in this type of games, I look for equilibria in trigger strategies. Uniqueness is guaranteed when the relative precision of the private signal (with respect to the public one) is large enough. The unique equilibrium is de…ned by a rate of return 0 , which produces a distribution of public and private signals such that there is a signal s 0 that makes the investor receiving it is indi¤erent between ‡eeing or staying. In such equilibrium, private investors withdraw their money in period 1 if their updated beliefs about fall below some critical value 0 (s 0 ). Two equations de…ne the two unknowns. The …rst comes from identifying the lowest level of returns that makes a run successful. Since noise is independent, the probability of a creditor holding beliefs below 0 is equal to the proportion of investors with beliefs below
can be rewritten as,
The fact that, in equilibrium, the marginal investor must be indi¤erent between staying or ‡eeing, provides the second equation. Given the probability of a successful run,
, this indi¤erence condition can be expressed as
When > 0 ; rolling-over gives r units of utility more than ‡eeing. If, instead, < 0 the run is successful and ‡eeing gives w units of utility more. Rearranging the expression above,
Equations (2) and (3) deliver the equilibrium values 0 and s 0 that characterize the economy. The probability of default is P ( < 0 ) and the size of the run P (s < s 0 ):
III. Enter the Sovereign Bankruptcy Court
Now, a Sovereign Bankruptcy Court (SBC) with powers to declare a payments standstill is introduced in the model economy. The goal is to analyze how this a¤ects the coordination problem and the likelihood of sovereign debt crises.
A Sovereign Bankruptcy Court
In the model, the Court monitors issuing countries and, when these undergo …nancial stress, decide whether a temporary payments suspension (standstill) is to be applied. In line with the proposal by Eichengreen and Portes and Ghosal and Miller (2003) , the Court aims to …ght liquidity problems. This view di¤ers from the one held by Krueger (2002) or Je¤rey Sachs, who envisions this institution as a tool to cope with insolvency problems. We address this di¤erence by discussing an extension in which the SBC is also in charge of dealing with insolvency problems. I also discuss another model extension in which the Government has to choose a level of e¤ort. The aim is to study the implications of the SBC for the Governments' incentives to apply costly policies.
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A model of sovereign debt crises in the presence of a SBC
The Court and investors move simultaneously in period 1. Analogous to investors', the SBC's rule of action is based on a private signal it receives in the interim period. The analysis, from a partial equilibrium perspective, leaves again D and I unchanged. The SBC's goal is to avoid liquidity-induced defaults. The Court is not interested in protecting countries doomed to fail ( < s ) or solvent ( > (f )).
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Using its signal, the SBC decides whether to call a payments standstill. Declaring a standstill has a …xed cost, C > 0, for the Court. The Court's payo¤ also depends on taking the right decision If the standstill is properly called, the SBC perceives a utility R: But if the standstill is incorrectly called, it faces disutility qR: The SBC will be declare a standstill whenever the expected payo¤ from doing so is non-negative. As before, investors perceive utility r when, after rolling-over, the country does not default, and w if, after ‡eeing, the country defaults: Note that if the Court correctly called a standstill, those who rolled over receive a higher payo¤. 24 The SBC receives a signal S = + v, where v N (0; 1 ): Using it, it's beliefs become jS N (
and denote the cumulative distribution and the density function of the Court, with and ! respectively. The Court knows the distribution of and s i . 2 2 Note that ex-ante agreement to submit to an SBC implies a contractual obligation by both creditors and sovereigns. According to Horn (2004) , sovereigns can only renounce immunity from jurisdiction and execution by contractual means. 2 3 The assumption that the multilateral sector seeks to intervene only in fundamentally sound countries is standard in the literature (Morris and Shin, 2006). The SBC seeks to disrupt market functioning as little as possible. 2 4 In Rochet and Vives (2004) the large player´s payo¤s are monetary. In this case they could re ‡ect the ine¤ective disruption on international capital ‡ows or reputational concerns (such as a widening of the perceived accuracy of its information).
Liquidity and solvency with a SBC
If f investors ‡ee, the minimum rate at which the country is still solvent in period 2 is (f ) = s + k
: Whenever 2 ( 1; (f )); if the SBC does not act, the country defaults. Instead, if < s the country defaults regardless the action taken by the SBC. Only if 2 [ s ; (f )] the SBC can avoid a default:
Solvency, runs and standstills in equilibrium
This section characterizes the new equilibrium. As in the benchmark, the core of the model is the coordination problem among investors. In addition, now they must consider the action taken by the SBC. The payo¤ of rolling over depends positively on both the amount of investors rolling over and on the willingness of the Court to call a standstill. Similar to that on Corsetti et al. (2004) and Corsetti et al. (2006) , the model presents an equilibrium in which investors employ trigger strategies. 25 Four variables characterize the equilibrium. A threshold below which the country defaults if there is no standstill. A threshold s for investors' private signals and two thresholds, S sup and S inf < S sup , determining the range of signals for which the SBC will act Let's start by . If investors' threshold is s ; the proportion withdrawing is f = P rob
Plugging this into (2), the fundamental insolvency treshold is
When the Court does not intervene, there will be a default if (s ):
Next, I recover S sup and S inf . In the margin the Court is indi¤erent between calling a standstill or not, and the expression holds with equality. De…ne
. The Court assigns probability R s !(( p + ( SBC ))d to its intervention being successful: The SBC compares payo¤s as follows
(5) The SBC's optimal strategy is to call a standstill whenever the above inequality holds. As shown in Figure 1 and formalized in the next proposition, this rule of action leads the SBC to act when its signal falls within an interval. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Figure 1. SBC standstill declaration
Intuitively, the SBC calls a standstills if its beliefs do not fall far apart from [ s ; (f )]. As the SBC's signal worsens, the probability that it can avoids a default decreases, reducing the expected value of calling a standstill. Similarly, when the value of the signal increases, the probability of calling a standstill unnecessarily increases, reducing the Court's incentives to call one.
Finally, one can solve for the investors' threshold. They maximize their utility taking into account: (i) if < s ; the economy will default in period 2 no matter what the SBC does and, (ii), if 2 [ s ; (s )] the country defaults only if the SBC does not act. Therefore, they assign probability ( p ( + )( s i )) to the country defaulting no matter what the SBC does. Using the utility outcomes de…ned above, the payo¤ from not rolling over is,
and ! are, respectively, the density functions of and ; and
The …rst element within the square brackets is the probability assigned by creditors to the country defaulting despite the SBC action. As long as falls below s ; the country always defaults, justifying investors'decision to run. The second and third elements correspond to situations where the SBC could avoid a default, s < < . In this scenario not rolling over is optimal conditional upon the SBC not acting. As the SBC acts only if S 2 [S inf SBC ; S sup SBC ] we get two terms. The …rst for the case with a signal below S inf SBC ; and the second corresponding to signals above S sup SBC : Similarly, we can de…ne the corresponding payo¤ from rolling over as,
The …rst term collects the probability of a run failing regardless of the SBC. The second corresponds to the probability of the run being unsuccessful, conditional upon the Court acting. Note that the expressions above account for the fact that for every threshold for the creditors' beliefs there is a di¤erent maximum rate for default, : Every s determines a unique level of early withdrawals, which, in turn, implies a di¤erent maximum rate. Thereby, every s , by implying a di¤erent level of pressure on the domestic economy, leads to a di¤erent range of under which the SBC will be willing to act, i.e. [ s ; (s )]:
As before, investors' threshold corresponds to the signal making whoever receives it indi¤erent between staying or running. The condition U R U N R = 0 becomes
This equation determines the equilibrium threshold s . Although it is not possible to …nd a close form solution, in the Appendix I show that, in the case of highly informative private signals, there is a unique solution to this equation. This last equation, together with the one for (s ), the one for s ; and the one determining [S inf SBC ; S sup SBC ] completely characterize the equilibrium of the model.
Aggressiveness and Probability of crises: comparing outcomes
How does the introduction of the SBC a¤ect creditors'? Does its presence reduce the probability of observing a crisis? 
From the "mass condition" one can see that both 0 (s 0 ) and (s ) are strictly increasing in s (s); so that (s ) < 0 (s 0 ): Use the positive relation between (s) and s to get s < s 0 :
In the absence of a SBC, investors behave more aggressively, they run with higher signals, what increases the country's vulnerability. The probability of observing a crisis matches the probability of having a rate of return below the threshold, P rob( < 0 (s 0 )) > P rob( < (s )): As a result, the probability of observing a crisis is larger in the absence of the SBC. An International Court with authority to call standstills can provide not only ex post bene…ts (as it can implement barriers to capital out ‡ows), but is also bene…cial ex ante. It reduces the coordination problem, making runs and crises less likely.
The role of the accuracy of the Court' s information
The analysis so far shows that the presence of the Court is enough to reduce the coordination problem. Now, I analyze how the quality of the SBC's information a¤ect the coordination problem. Below I show that if the court acts cautiously and fundamentals are on the liquidity crisis zone, the better informed the SBC the smaller the coordination problem. First, I introduce a de…nition used in proving the statement above.
De…nition 3
The Court is said to act cautiously whenever its range of action (S inf SBC ; S sup SBC ) is contained in the interval ( s ; ): That is, the SBC does not act if its own signal falls out of the range of fundamentals for which it should do so.
Next, I show that higher variable costs make the Court more cautious and present it's implications for the precision of the Court's information.
Proposition 4 When q is su¢ ciently large, the Court acts cautiously.
Proof. Recall the equation determining the interval of action for the Court:
Note that lim When the fundamentals are such that a cautious SBC should call a standstill, the better informed it is the smaller the coordination problem. This implies that during liquidity crises, better information helps the most. @ < 0: 2) As a result the probability of a debt crisis, P ( < ) is also reduced.
If the Court is cautious then

SBC and incentives to apply costly policies
A common critique of support mechanisms is that they reduce debtors'incentives to apply adjustment policies. 26 In this section I assess the implications that the SBC has on Governments' incentives to implement costly e¤ort. To introduce e¤ort in the game I assume that before the roll-over game the government has to make a decision regarding the implementation of a set of costly policies. The Government can choose between exerting high and low e¤ort.
If the Government applies low e¤ort (does not implement adjustment policies), the expected return is L . If, instead, the government implements high e¤ort it gets an increased expected return, H > L . E¤ort has a Cost assumed to be …xed. Under this scheme, incentives to exert e¤ort depend on the conditions under which access to the SBC is granted. For simplicity the analysis is, again, performed assuming that private signals are arbitrarily precise.
Analyze …rst the case without Court. Without e¤ort , welfare is
Instead, if e¤ort is applied,
g and G stand, respectively, for the density and cumulative functions of the distribution of returns conditional on high e¤ort. The country's change in welfare from implementing e¤ort is,
The lower limit of integration is 0 , as only for returns above that threshold will the country have some cash left. The bene…ts of e¤ort come from both the increase in the expected return and it's e¤ect on liquidation costs.
When the SBC is present, the country's welfare can be calculated as,
For arbitrarily precise signals, two things occur. First, the SBC never defends a country if < s : Second, creditors never withdraw if > s : Thus, the lower limit of integration is s : The …rst element in the right hand side collects the expected increase in output. The second, the drop in liquidation costs. De…ne 4W
Given that 0 > s , then
The SBC increases the range of fundamentals for which countries enjoy the return to e¤ort making it more attractive This e¤ect is displayed in A. In addition, the SBC protects countries in such a way that only under relatively low returns a run is observed.
Countries worry less about liquidation costs, as they are already hedged against runs by the presence of the Court, D < 0. To understand the e¤ect of the SBC on e¤ort I analyze the model numerically. 27 I focus on the e¤ects of changes to the average return without e¤ort ( L ); the return to e¤ort (4 ), and the variance of the public signal ( 1 ): The values used on the parametrization are summarized in the Appendix.
For the SBC to incentivize e¤ort both leverage and liquidation costs had to be very high. 28 Figures 3a to 3f; in the Appendix, summarize the results. Figures 3a and 3b show how e¤ort changes with the initial average return. The reaction is shown both in scenarios with low/high variance where return to e¤ort is kept low, and scenarios with low/high returns to e¤ort while keeping the variance low. Only when the variance or the return to e¤ort are low, at low initial returns, the SBC does not lead to lower e¤ort. As the initial average return increases, the saving in liquidation costs grows faster without the Court, making e¤ort more desirable in the absence of the SBC. Similar results are obtained when the return to e¤ort is allowed to change (Figures 3c and 3d) . Finally, when the precision of the public signal falls, the di¤erence in incentives vanishes (Figures 3e and 3f ) . As uncertainty increases, any outcome becomes more feasible, reducing the relative gains from e¤ort.
Summary 7
Only when the initial return and the return to e¤ ort are low the SBC incentivizes e¤ ort. This incentive vanishes as fundamental (public) uncertainty increases.
This result re ‡ects the general view that policies aimed at helping countries in stress a¤ect incentives to reform. It is worth noting, however, that when the situation is relatively bad (low return without e¤ort), the SBC can help countries to apply costly policies. The next section argues that this tension can be limited by conditioning the recourse to the Court on the country's e¤ort.
Conditionality
Now, the SBC can only act in a country if such country has applied e¤ort, which as before is public knowledge. The Court sets a perfectly observable condition. 29 As a result, investors play the roll-over sub-game knowing if the SBC is to intervene or not. If e¤ort is high, the SBC will consider whether to act or not and investors will set their threshold at s : Conversely, if e¤ort is low, the SBC will never act and investors choose to run if s i < s 0 . In turn, this a¤ects the e¤ort choice. Now the level of utility of the government conditional on e¤ort is 4W Cost; if high. What if resort to the SBC is conditioned to policy e¤ort? With an SBC, the utility from exerting e¤ort is,
In the absence of the SBC the incentive to exert e¤ort is as before, 4W N . The implications of this type of approach are straightforward. While a policy of unconditional support is likely to reduce the incentive to exert e¤ort, an implementation in which support depends on the country's behavior, represents an incentive to apply e¤ort.
SBC and solvency crises
What would happen if the SBC would be to declare payment moratoria also as a way to …ght solvency crises?
One thing is certain, analogous to the result in Corsetti et al. (2006) , if the SBC would care also about solvency it would intervene more often, reducing again the need to second guess other creditors and mitigating, potentially, the coordination problem. However, whenever < s , the Court will be freezing investors inside the country but will not avert a default. One the one hand this would still be positive because by preventing a run the Court is avoiding the ine¢ cient losses associated with an early closure of the investment, increasing the size. However, on the other hand, investors would be forced to accept not only postponed payments but also in a reduced amount, as in this case some PSI would be required. The issue would be how to balance these two e¤ects. Indeed, depending on the perceived pay-o¤s it could well be the case that investors prefer to ‡ee. 30 
IV. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the potential for a Sovereign Bankruptcy Court to mitigate the coordination problem inherent to sovereign debt in the context of liquidity problems. After reviewing the most relevant proposals for the setting of up a Court, I present a model where the SBC can declare payments standstills whenever a country faces a liquidity crisis. The model focuses on the coordination problem faced by sovereign creditors required to roll-over their debts. It shows that as the Court forces investors to focus on its course of action rather than just second guessing other investors beliefs, the scale of the coordination problem is reduced and creditors become less aggressive. Interestingly, this result holds regardless of the precision of the information handled by the Court. In situations when a country is prone to su¤er liquidity crises is when better information provides more good coordination.
